This issue of Done Dedicated to the context of a recently published paper describing three possible attacks on Ethereum stock proof algorithms.
These are serious attacks with formal analysis and technical cuts. Repairs will be laid out prior to merging and Will not Delay the integration timer.
Forkchoice attacks, mitigation and timing
There has recently been little discussion surrounding the newly published paper, co-authored by a team at Stanford and some EF researchers. This article gives the public three survivors and three re-attacks on the beacon chain unification mechanism. Without Providing any mitigation or context of what is meant for future Ethereum integration improvements. This paper is published in an effort to facilitate better reviews and collaborations before introducing fixes on the main network. However, it has failed to provide context on impacts and mitigation. This leaves room for uncertainty to continue the discussion.
Let us get to the bottom of it.
Yes these are serious attacks ⚔️
First, let us clarify these are Serious Problems that, if not mitigated, threaten the stability of the beacon chain. To this end, it is important that the fixes are placed before the beacon chain occupies the security of the Ethereum operating layer at the point of integration.
But with a simple fix 🛡
The good news is that two simple fixes to the opt-in option have been proposed – “Promoter Request” and “Sync Proposer View”. Proponents of her case have been working to make the actual transcript of this statement available online. Applied In at least one customer. Synchronization of the applicant aspect also looks promising, but pre-existing in its official analysis. So far, researchers expect the proposer to drive the landing in a specific manner because of its simplicity and maturity in analysis.
At high levels, paper attacks are caused by over-reliance on signals from affirmations – especially for a small number of opponents’ affirmations to suggest honest views in one direction or another. This reliance is for good reason – almost entirely confirmation. Former Posts Block reorgs in the beacon chain – but these attacks prove it comes at a high price – Previously reorgs and other lively attacks. Intuitively, the solutions outlined above strike a balance of power between affirmation and a blocking request, rather than living at one end or the other.
Caspar did an excellent job, briefly explaining both the attack and the proposed solution. Check before leaving The twitter network. For the best tl you will find.
And what about mergers? ⛓
Ensuring a repair is in place before merging is Must be. But there is a fix and it is simple to implement.
This fix targets only optional options and therefore is in line with the integration specifications as written today. Under normal conditions, the selection of options is the same as it is now, but in the event of an attack scenario, a fixed version helps to provide chain stability. This means putting out repairs made No. Introduce change, break or need a “solid fit”.
Researchers and developers expect that by the end of November, the proponents’ push will be officially integrated into a consensus manner and that it will go live on Merge testnets in mid-January.
Finally, I want to give a shout out to Joachim Neu, Nusret Taş, and David Tse – members of the Tse Lab in Stanford – as they did. Invaluable. In not only identifying but addressing the key issues discussed above 🚀